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SUMMARY
With the failure of the Rambouillet peace
talks and violence against ethnic Albanian
civilians escalating, on March 24 NATO began
Operation Allied Force airstrikes against
targets in Serbia and Kosovo. DOD defined
the mission as attacking the Yugoslav military
infrastructure with the objectives of deterring
future attacks on Albanian Kosovars and
degrading the ability of Yugoslav forces to
carry out these operations.  Initial target selec-
tion focused on airfields, air defense and com-
munication centers, military barracks, and
some equipment production facilities. Attacks
extended to logistical support facilities and
lines of resupply, and to an increasing extent
Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo.  Late in
the campaign, targets also included Yugosla-
via’s national electrical grid and ra-
dio/television stations.   In all, NATO aircraft
flew over 37,000 sorties in the 78-day air
campaign.  At the end of the campaign about
1,100 aircraft were participating, with the
United States contributing about 725.  Of the
total aircraft, about 535 were strike aircraft,
(U.S. 323/Allied 213).Thirteen of NATO’s 19
nations  contributed aircraft to the operation,
with 8 nations’ aircraft flying combat missions.
The only NATO fatalities in Operation Allied
Force were two U.S. Apache helicopter pilots
killed in a training accident in Albania.
With the air campaign escalating, on June
4, Yugoslavia accepted a peace proposal
devised at a G-8 summit, and on June 8, sign-
ed a military-technical agreement with NATO
officials providing for the withdrawal of all
Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and turning
military control of  the province over to
NATO’s peacekeeping forces (KFOR). On
June 10, the U.N. Security Council Resolution
2580 endorsed the peace settlement and “an
international security presence with substantial
NATO participation.”
Dubbed Operation Joint Guardian,
KFOR totals about 38,000, down from over
50,000 in 1999.  The United States has about
5,600 troops in Kosovo and neighboring
countries.  The U.S. has suffered no casualties
from hostile action. Ethnic persecution and
violence against Serbs and Gypsies remaining
in Kosovo continue, while criticism of the Uni-
ted Nations slowness in establishing a func-
tioning civil government grows. A recent
increase in violent resistance to KFOR troops,
and potential instability on the Kosovo-Serbia
border has raised the issue of reinforcement,
but only Italy, France, and Britain have as-
signed additional troops. 
Congressional concerns have focused on
the impact of Balkan operations on overall
military readiness, and whether there has been
an equitable distribution of costs among the
NATO allies. On January 31, DOD issued a
Kosovo/Operation Allied Force after-action
report to Congress addressing a wide range of
issues.  Congress provided supplemental
appropriations of $3 billion for FY1999 and $2
billion for FY2000 to cover DOD incremental
costs in Kosovo operations. Together with the






On July 13, the President signed into law (P.L. 106-246) the FY2001 Military
Construction Act, which contained $2 billion in FY2000 emergency supplemental
appropriations for Kosovo operations. The House-Senate Conference report on H.R. 4276,
FY2001 DOD appropriations, was filed on July 17 (H.Rept. 106-754), providing $1.7 billion
for Kosovo.  The report was agreed to by the House on July 19, 367-58 (Roll Call Vote No.
413), and awaits consideration by the Senate. 
 On May 18, the House passed the DOD Authorization bill (H.R.. 4205) approving
Kosovo funding as requested, but including a provision that conditions continued U.S.
participation in KFOR upon 1) presidential certification by April 1, 2000 that the NATO
allies have provided specific percentages of the aid contributions they have pledged for
Kosovo humanitarian, reconstruction, civil administration, and police needs; and 2) a report
providing specific detailed information on these pledges and actual contributions. The
Senate version (S. 2549), contains a reporting requirement regarding European
contributions, but no certification requirement and no mandatory withdrawal provisions.
It is expected these issues will be addressed in the up-coming House-Senate conference.   
Spanish General Juan Ortuno has assumed KFOR command, as the 5-nation Eurocorps
assumes its first operational command responsibilities.  Comprising military personnel from
Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the Eurocorps represents one of the
first steps towards a more self-reliant unified European military capability.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Background
Once an autonomous province of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo has a 90% ethnic
Albanian population.  It nevertheless holds an emotional place in Serbian nationalist tradition.
As part of his nationalist program, Yugoslav President Milosevic revoked Kosovo’s
autonomous status, putting it under control of the Serbian-dominated Belgrade government.
An armed ethnic Albanian resistance movement developed, led by the so-called Kosovo
Liberation Army.  The Belgrade government responded in early 1998 with counter-insurgency
operations, with Yugoslav military  ground units and aircraft destroying villages and
executing civilians suspected of supporting the insurgents. 
In 1998, NATO political leaders turned their attention to the Kosovo region because of
the flow of refugees to the southwest into Western Europe and Albania (itself destabilized by
regional uprisings in 1997), and concerns about the conflict spilling over into the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). FYROM, an independent nation bordering
Kosovo to the southeast,  also has a large Albanian population  alienated from its central
government. 
In May 1998, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s governing body, directed accelerated
assessment of “a full range of options with the mission of halting or disrupting a systematic
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campaign of violent repression in Kosovo.” Options considered included; 1) preventative
deployments in Albania and FYROM to stabilize the borders; 2) declaration of no-fly/no tank
zones in Kosovo and enforcement of them with NATO air forces; 3) direct military
intervention either through airstrikes or ground troops deployments; and 4) peacekeeping
deployments in the event of a political resolution.  On June 15, 1998, NATO launched a 6-
hour air exercise over Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.  Code-
named Determined Falcon, the exercise involved 80 aircraft from 13 NATO air forces
(Canada, Luxembourg, and Iceland not participating), and was conducted from 15 airbases
in 5 countries. Twenty-seven U.S. land and carrier-based aircraft took part.
On September 24, 1998, NATO defense ministers authorized an “activation warning”
for limited air strikes and a phased air campaign in Kosovo. On October 12, NATO defense
ministers authorized an “activation order,” placing the necessary forces under the NATO
command.  The following day, it was announced that U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke had
negotiated an agreement with Serbian leader Milosevic that postponed the threat of airstrikes
if the Serbian government 1) would reduce its troops and security forces in Kosovo to “pre-
crisis” levels; 2) permit unarmed NATO reconnaissance flights over Kosovo; 3) accede to an
international force of 2,000 unarmed civilian monitors to oversee the ceasefire; and 4) begin
meaningful negotiations towards Kosovar autonomy.
Meaningful negotiations never took place, owing to recalcitrance on both sides, and
sporadic violence continued, with increasing reports of Serbian executions of Albanian
civilians.  Concerned over escalating violence, and its possible spread to other areas of the
Balkans, on January 30, 1999, the NATO allies authorized Secretary-General Solana to order
airstrikes anywhere in Yugoslavia, if the warring Serb and Albanian factions had not reached
a peace settlement by February 20.
The “Contact Group,” an informal forum of representatives from the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Russia dealing with Balkan crises, devised a
framework for a peace settlement. They did not wish to encourage continued fighting for
Kosovar independence, but rather sought a settlement that would restore Kosovo’s autonomy
within Yugoslavia.  However, the Serb government did not agree to the framework, the so-
called Rambouillet Agreement, and the talks adjourned. 
During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved
out of garrison in Kosovo in violation of the October agreement, and about 20,000 additional
Serb troops massed at the northern Kosovo border. With violence against ethnic Albanian
civilians escalating, on March 24, NATO began airstrikes against targets in Serbia and
Kosovo. These airstrikes are the first military offensive action undertaken by NATO without
specific U.N. endorsement.  U.N. Security Council approval has not been sought because
both Russia and China, each with veto power on the Council, continue to oppose the use of
force to resolve the Kosovo crisis. The September 23, 1998 U.N. Security Council resolution,
which called for the immediate withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, did,
however, reference the U.N. Charter’s Article VII, which permits military force to maintain
international security.
NATO defined five conditions for ending it air campaign:
! Cessation of Serb operations against the Albanians in Kosovo;
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! Withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo;
! Acceptance of Kosovar democratic self-government;
! Acceptance of a NATO-led peacekeeping force; and
! Return of Kosovar refugees.
On May 6 1999, at the G-8 economic summit, a another set of principles for a peace
settlement were agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
Japan, Canada, Italy, and Russia.  Russian acceptance was regarded as a major step forward
in increasing the pressure on Milosevic to accede to NATO demands.  These G-8 principles
are:
! Immediate end to the violence.
! Withdrawal of all Yugoslav military and other security forces.
! Deployment of  UN- endorsed international civil and security presences.
! Interim international administration with U.N. Security Council approval.
! Return of all refugees, and access for aid organizations.
! Substantial self-government for Kosovo.
! Economic development of the region.
On June 4,1999, the Yugoslav government accepted the provisions of the G-8 peace
plan, and on June 9 NATO and Yugoslav military officials signed a Military-Technical
Agreement (MTA) which provided for the phased withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces form
Kosovo by June 20, 1999, and details the authority of the KFOR commander to enforce the
peace agreement with all means necessary.  On June 10, the United Nations Security Council
passed a resolution (No. 2580), endorsing the peace-keeping mission under Chapter VII of
the U.N.  Charter, which authorizes the use of force.  Also on June 10, NATO suspended the
air campaign upon evidence of Yugoslav forces beginning to withdraw from Kosovo.
Military Operations
The Air Campaign
On March 24, NATO began air operations, code-named Operation Allied Force, against
targets primarily in Serbia and Kosovo.  DOD defined the mission as attacking the Yugoslav
military infrastructure with the objective of deterring future attacks on Albanian Kosovars and
degrading the ability of Yugoslav forces to carry out these operations.  Target selection
focused on airfields, air defense and communication centers, military barracks, and some
equipment production facilities. Attacks then extended to logistical support facilities and lines
of resupply, Yugoslav ground forces in Kosovo, and the national electrical and television
systems. In total, NATO aircraft flew over 35,000 sorties (1 aircraft flight), about one-third
of which were strike sorties, launching about 23,000 munitions.  Initially, cloudy weather over
Kosovo severely hampered attack aircraft equipped with laser-guided munitions, and also
reduced the ability to locate and target Yugoslav ground units.  In addition to the weather
conditions, a strong concern over minimal risk to NATO pilots dictated that low-level flights
to attack ground units not be undertaken until Serb air defenses had been sufficiently




NATO HQ acknowledged that the air campaign did not impede the Serb operations to
drive the Albanian population from Kosovo.  The inability to stop Serb operations brought
strong criticism of the decision to launch the air campaign while completely ruling out any use
of ground forces.  Aside from official NATO and Administration spokesmen, few, if any,
observers believed that air power alone could  achieve the desired objectives.  Press reports
indicated that NATO political leaders were cautioned of an air campaign’s potential shortfalls,
but believed that domestic public opinion would not support a ground invasion of Kosovo.
It was then perceived as a choice between “do nothing” or proceed with air strikes.  Some
also suggested that in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, some advocates have
overemphasized the capabilities of air power, encouraging the belief that ground forces are
no longer as crucial to achieving military objectives.
There was also criticism that “command by committee” hampered NATO military
leaders’ ability to wage an effective, rapidly responsive campaign.  Target lists, weapons used,
and forces deployed were all subject to prior approval by all NATO governments.  This
slowed decisionmaking, constrained operations, and sometimes emphasized political over
military considerations.  However, NATO officials maintain that SACEUR  received all
resources requested, and emphasized that this consensual process was critical to ensuring the
cohesion of the alliance. A more fundamental criticism is that the air campaign’s actual
objective from the start was political, not military — i.e., to bring President Milosevic back
to the bargaining table. This, in turn, contributed to a constrained, incremental approach to
targeting. 
Secretary Cohen, SACEUR Gen. Clark, and the recently retired Chairman of NATO’s
Military Committee Gen. Klaus Naumann all recommended that NATO’s decision-making
processes for conducting a military campaign be examined and, in some way, streamlined.
None, however, offered specific suggestions, noting that any changes made would have to
gain and sustain acceptance by all NATO members.  NATO’s current structure and
procedures were created to deal with homeland defense against invasion.  Out-of-area
operations like Allied Force present different political constraints and military requirements.
Some have suggested greater delegation of authority to SACEUR, once the alliance has made
the decision to carry out a military operation.  However, within an alliance of democracies
which maintains full consensus as a fundamental principle, this approach may not achieve
acceptance.  In addressing this issue, Gen. Clark emphasized that, structural reforms aside,
“there has to be a strong political consensus founded on a common perception of military
doctrine to overcome the obstacles we hit in the air campaign”. (Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing, July 20, 1999)
In responding to the critics of the air campaign, Gen. Naumann has noted that NATO
planned for a limited operation from the outset, and made this fact public, while President
Milosevic “planned for a war”.  Naumann also observed that NATO threatened military
action, without  having a consensus on how it would be carried out, thereby precluding its
military commanders’ use of “overwhelming force from the beginning.”  (Defense News, July
20, 1999)
In the wake of the Yugoslav acceptance of NATO peace conditions, supporters of
reliance upon NATO airpower believe they have been vindicated in their approach.  They
emphasize that NATO sustained no combat fatalities in the course of the 78-day campaign,
and that the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo was achieved.  The air
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campaign’ critics, however, point to the fact that it did not prevent the expulsion of almost
the entire Albanian population of Kosovo, which will now require a very lengthy period of
resettlement and reconstruction.
The Department of Defense Joint Staff provided the following initial statistical summary












Allies:  9,275 (35%)
On October 14, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton provided the Senate Armed
Services Committee with DOD’s preliminary “lessons learned” observations
[http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/lessons/acw.html].  The final version Report to
Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report  was issued January 31, 2000
shortly before the FY2001 budget submission.  Among the, were the following:
! Parallel U.S. and NATO command and control structures complicated
operational planning and maintenance of unity of command.Disparities
between U.S. capabilities and those of our allies, including precision strike,
mobility, and command, control, and communications capabilities impeded
U.S. ability to operate at optimal effectiveness with NATO allies.
! DoD needs to develop options for earlier and more efficient use of  its
reserve forces.DoD systems for planning and executing transportation of its
forces were strained by the rapidly evolving requirements.
! The heavy commitment of NATO’s air defense suppression forces indicates
the  need to find innovative and affordable ways to exploit our technological
skills in electronic combat.Success using the latest generation of air-delivered
munitions systems in Kosovo validates plans to increase inventories.
! Task Force Hawk pointed out the need to regularly experiment with the
independent use of key elements of all of our  forces without their usual
supporting elements. Improved unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) mission
planning, improved processes for interaction between UAV operators and
manned aircraft, frequent and realistic training opportunities, and equipment
upgrades for individual UAVs all would benefit force effectiveness.
! Humanitarian operations highlighted  the importance of such resources as
linguists and civil affairs personnel, engineering assets capable of emergency




On May 8, 2000, Newsweek reported obtaining a copy of an unreleased Kosovo bomb
damage assessment whose existence had been rumored for some time.  The report is the result
of an effort ordered by SACEUR Gen. Wes Clark to obtain an accurate account of the
damage inflicted on the Serb military in Kosovo.  Conducted by the Munitions Effectiveness
Assessment Team (MEAT), which was composed primarily of U.S. Air Force personnel, the
damage survey was conducted by helicopter and “walking the terrain.”  While previously
released statistics claimed 120 tanks, 220 armored personnel carriers, and up to 450 artillery
pieces destroyed, the MEAT team could confirm only 14 tanks, 12 armored personnel
carriers, and 20 artillery pieces killed.  Of over 700 successful airstrikes publically claimed,
the Air Force inspectors on the ground found evidence to support only 58.  No evidence of
the surreptitious removal of damaged or destroyed equipment was found. The team did find
evidence of very successful Serb use of decoys, including repeatedly re-fabricating an entire
bridge to induce repeated NATO strikes. [“ The Kosovo Cover-Up”, Newsweek, May 15,
2000, p. 23]
Newsweek sources indicated that pressure to define a successful air campaign in terms
of numbers led NATO and DOD leaders to order a “re-analysis” using looser evidence
criteria, hereby allowing a more positive report for public release.  The MEAT report
supports the view of Lt. Gen. Michael Short, Operation Allied Force Air Commander, that
the most effective use of air power against the Milosevic regime was targeting the political
and utility infrastructure in Serbia itself.  It also appears to confirm that high altitude bombing
remains ineffective against mobile ground forces, unless they are massed in the open, and that
decoys and “spoofing” remain very effective countermeasures.
The MEAT report notwithstanding, it can be argued that the controversy over “bean-
counting” distracts from the fact that the NATO air campaign did force a Serb withdrawal
from Kosovo, for whatever reason.  With that being the over-arching objective of Operation
Allied Force, the effort remains a success regardless of the number of “tank kills”.
The Department of Defense responded to the Newsweek article in a May 9th press
conference with Air Force Brig. Gen. John Corley who headed the NATO assessment efforts.
He defended the accuracy of NATO and DOD’s previously released statistics, and suggested
that the report Newsweek obtained may have been an “interim” report based solely on ground
observation of wreckage.  DOD acknowledged in a post-news conference release that only
14 destroyed tanks were found, along with 12 self-propelled artillery pieces.  However, Brig.
Gen. Corley said that other information sources (e.g. cockpit video, reconnaissance film)
provided adequate evidence of additional destroyed vehicles removed by the Serbs.  Brig.
Gen. Corley and DOD spokesman Ken Bacon both emphasized that no report was ever
suppressed.
The MEAT report deserves closer scrutiny for an accurate assessment of current Air
Force capabilities and shortfalls in weaponry and tactics.  The suspicion that the report was
suppressed, or that extraordinary efforts were made to provide more favorable conclusions
in the final version, could serve to undermine the credibility of NATO and DOD public
reports in the future.  Congressional re-consideration of the report and the manner in which
it’s conclusions were handled may be expected.
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Ground Force Operations — KFOR (Operation Joint Guardian) 
Because air operations did not stop Serb operations against Kosovar Albanians, public
discussion of NATO ground force intervention was widespread.  U.S. and NATO spokesmen
continued to maintain there was no intention to introduce ground troops without “a
permissive environment.”  In the latter weeks of the air campaign, the British government
began to push  for ground intervention, but was unable to win the support of other alliance
members.  Though President Clinton and others publically made the point that no option was
permanently “off the table”, and NATO HQ re-examined the military requirements for an
invasion of Kosovo and even Serbia, at no time did there appear alliance-wide support of
offensive ground operations.  Indeed, several member governments, particularly Greece, Italy,
and Germany were publically adamant in their opposition.
With the Yugoslav acceptance of the peace plan devised by the G-8 and proposed to the
Yugoslav government by Finnish President Ahtisaari, the focus turned to Operation Joint
Guardian, the peace-keeping mission to be undertaken by KFOR. To facilitate this operation,
NATO obtained the Yugoslav acceptance of a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA)
prepared by NATO on June 9.  The following day, the United Nations Security Council
passed a resolution (S/RES/1244) endorsing the peace plan and an “international security
presence” in Kosovo for its enforcement.  On the same day, June 10 , NATO Secretary-
General Solana reported that Serb forces were beginning to withdraw from Kosovo and
ordered suspension of the air campaign.  On June 17, with the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops
and police complete, NATO officially terminated the air campaign.
KFOR did not begin deploying into Kosovo until June 12, reportedly waiting to
synchronize its deployment with the withdrawal of Serb forces in order to avoid co-mingling
forces.  This delay, however, allowed time for a 200-strong contingent of Russian troops to
leave their SFOR station in Bosnia and occupy the airport in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital.
Reportedly planned by the Russian General Staff, and endorsed by president Yeltsin, to ensure
Russia a high-profile role in KFOR. This action occasioned high-level U.S.-Russian
negotiations.  An agreement reached on June 18, provides for shared control of Pristina
airport operations, with Russian oversight of ground operations and air operations under
KFOR control.  In addition, Russia will deploy troops in the U.S., German, and French
sectors.  Russian troops will be under a unified KFOR command, with a Russian general
officer  at KFOR HQ.  Russia will not have an independent territorial sector as it initially
demanded.  NATO refused to grant Russia an independent territorial sector, believing that
could be the first step toward a permanent partitioning of the province.  To date, KFOR
commanders have praised the Russian troops for their professionalism. 
Military-Technical Agreement (MTA).  After some initial recalcitrance, Yugoslav
military officials signed the MTA on June 9, 1999.  The MTA affirms the terms of the peace
plan, and provides specific details of its implementation.  Some of the main provisions are:
! KFOR will deploy and operate without hindrance.
! KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain
a secure environment, and to carry out its mission.The KFOR commander
has the right to compel the removal or  relocation of forces and weapons,
and to order the cessation of any activities that pose a potential threat to
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KFOR, its mission, or a third party.  Failure to comply will result in military
action, including the use of necessary force.
! KFOR has the right to monitor and inspect all facilities or activities that may
have a police or military capability, or are deemed otherwise relevant to
compliance. The KFOR commander is the “final authority” for the
interpretation of the MTA.
! Air and Ground Safety Zones will extend 25 and 5 kilometers respectively
beyond the borders of Kosovo, and no Yugoslav forces, aside from local
police, may enter these zones without KFOR permission. All Yugoslav
military, paramilitary, and police forces will conduct a phased withdrawal
from Kosovo, to be completed by June 20, 1999.
! Yugoslav forces will mark and remove all mines, booby traps, and obstacles
as they withdraw. A subsequent, separate agreement will address the return
of “agreed Yugoslav and Serb personnel.”
KFOR Operations.  KFOR command now rotates every six months, and is currently
held by Spanish General Juan Ortuno.  KFOR divided the province into five territorial sectors
under the command of British, German, French, Italian, and U.S. contingents.  Other nations’
contingents are assigned to one of these sectors. (For current national contingents, see below)
Over the last several months, KFOR nations have quietly withdrawn troops, reducing
KFOR from close to 50,000 to about 38,000 troops.  Those nations with notable withdrawals
were France, Russia, and the United Kingdom.  The other large contingents, Germany and
the United States, have remained relatively constant.  With an upsurge in violence and
resistance to KFOR troops, and concerns over Kosovar Albanians fostering unrest among
Albanians living across the border in Serbia, the issue of the need for reinforcements has
arisen.  France and Italy have re-deployed about 1,200 troops, but other nations have not.
SACEUR Gen. Clark maintains that additional reinforcements are not needed.  However,
NATO has undertaken Dynamic Response 2000, a training exercise in Kosovo intended to
demonstrate reinforcement capability.  The exercise has involved 1,500 troops from the
United States, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and Argentina.  The Department of Defense,
in response to an incident when U.S. troops were stoned by demonstrators while assisting
weapons searches in the French sector, has instructed that U.S. troops not be deployed out
of the U.S. except in emergency situations.  The U.S. troops also have heightened
responsibilities along the Kosovo-Serbia border, where former KLA members are suspected
of encouraging and arming Albanian dissidents in Serbia’s Presavo valley.
A repeated complaint from KFOR commanders has been the slowness of the United
Nations efforts to deploy an international police force and establish a functioning judiciary.
The U.N. has been hampered by lack of funds and bureaucratic inertia on the part of donor
countries. However, a functioning police force and court system are critical elements for
increasing stability in Kosovo. On June 20 1999, NATO announced an agreement with the
Kosovo Liberation Army  for its phased disbanding.  The presence of armed KLA guerillas
has given KFOR some concerns, and KFOR has disarmed KLA groups that could have
presented a threat to security.  In the demilitarization agreement, the KLA agreed to:
! Renounce the use of force and comply with KFOR and U.N. Interim Civil




! Acknowledge KFOR’s use of necessary force to ensure compliance.
! Not carry weapons in specified areas.
The accord also provided a 90-day timetable for the KLA’s demilitarization, including
the cantonment of weapons (except authorized rifles and handguns), the prohibition of
uniforms, and prohibitions on training and “parades”.  The accord makes reference to giving
KLA members “special consideration” for positions in the future Kosovo police and civil
administration, and establishing a Kosovo army “on the lines of the U.S. National Guard” at
an unspecified time in the future.
On August 20,1999, the KFOR HQ announced that the KLA had complied with the 60-
day deadline to canton all heavy weapons and 60% of all small arms.  The deadline for full
demilitarization has been extended for 10 days until September 29.  Official compliance aside,
as sporadic violence against Kosovar Serbs continued, KFOR’s Gen. Jackson has questioned
whether the KLA leadership had full control of its personnel. A further complicating factor
is the existence of a significant organized crime element in the province, which may also
include KLA personnel.
In an attempt to involve former KLA personnel in positive activities, NATO and U.N.
officials have agreed to the creation of the Kosovo Corps.  NATO and the U.N. intend the
3,000-strong organization to be a uniformed civilian force to deal with emergency situations
such as forest fires, search and rescue, and reconstruction. Some KLA leaders see the Kosovo
Corps as the nucleus of a future Kosovo army, a view rejected by NATO and U.N. officials.
Of recent concern is evidence that former KLA members are encouraging Albanian rebels
who live right across the border in Serbia’s Presavo valley.  KFOR is attempting to interdict
these efforts, because they could provoke Yugoslav government action could further de-
stabilize the region.
NATO Allies’ Military Participation in Balkan Operations
 Table 1 reflects data provided by KFOR HQ as of March 23 on the national contingents
serving in KFOR.  Non-NATO countries are marked with an asterisk.
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Table 1. Allied Military Participation in Balkan Operations
Country KFOR
Contingent
Argentina* 1 Field Hospital (113)
Austria* 1 support battalion (480)
Azerbajian* 1 support platoon  (34)
Belgium 1 mechanized infantry battalion
(700)
Czech Republic 1 reconnaissance company
(122)
Denmark 1 armored battalion (800)
Finland* 1 motorized  infantry battalion
(795)
France 1 reinforced mechanized
infantry brigade  (4,550)
Georgia* 1 supply platoon  (34)
Germany 1 armored division
(4,200)
Greece 2 mechanized infantry
battalions
(1,150)
Hungary 1 support  battalion
(322)
Iceland medical personnel (50)
Ireland* 1 transport company  (104)
Jordan 1 infantry company (100)
Italy 1 reinforced armored brigade
(4,750)
Latvia 1 support platoon (50)
Lithuania* 1 support platoon  (50)
Luxembourg 1 support platoon (50)
Morocco 1 field hospital (350)
Netherlands 1 reinforced artillery battalion
(600)






Poland 1 airborne battalion
(1,250)
Portugal 1 infantry battalion (329)
Russia* 1 airborne brigade (3,300)
Slovakia* 1 engineer platoon  (40)
Spain 1 mechanized infantry battalion
(1,100)
Sweden 1 mechanized battalion (750)
Switzerland 1 logistics company  (134)
Turkey 1 mechanized infantry brigade
(948)
Ukraine 1 helicopter detachment
1 supply company
(200)
United Arab Emirates 1 mechanized infantry brigade
(1,250)
United Kingdom 1 reinforced  armored brigade
  (3,200)
United States 1 reinforced mechanized
infantry brigade
(5,600)
Costs of Operation Allied Force/Joint Guardian
Within NATO, each nation participating in Operation Allied Force assumes the cost of
its own operations.  NATO does not provide estimates of the overall cost of the operation or
of the cost of each member’s contributions.  Most NATO governments are in still in the
process of determining the incremental costs of the operation, and reliable information is not
yet available.
On April 19, the Administration submitted a $6.05 billion emergency supplemental
appropriation request to cover military operations in Kosovo and continuing air operations
in Southwest Asia during FY1999.  On May 18, the House approved a House-Senate
conference agreement on H.R. 1141, providing $14.9 billion in FY1999 supplemental
appropriations.  Of this, only $10.8 billion is defense-related,   and includes funds for items
other than Kosovo operations such as a military pay raise, military construction, training, and
equipment/munitions procurement.   On May 20, the  Senate concurred in approving H.R.
1141.   It was signed into law (P.L. 106-31) on May 21.  The Administration’s funding
request assumed offensive military operations against Yugoslavia through September 1999.
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With the campaign ending in June, DOD calculated its actual FY99 incremental costs to be
$3.0 billion, and the remainder of the appropriated supplemental being re-programmed.
The Administration’s FY2000 budget request contained no funds for combat or
peacekeeping operations in Kosovo.  The House Armed Services Committee expressed its
concern that under or unbudgeted contingency operations have diverted funds from “quality
of life, readiness, and modernization” programs.  Seeing no funds budgeted for Kosovo
operations in FY2000, and seeking to ensure that incremental Kosovo-related costs would
be dealt with only through specific budgeted accounts or supplemental appropriations, the
Committee inserted a provision in DOD’s  authorizing legislation (H.R. 1401) prohibiting the
use of any funds authorized by the legislation for military operations in Yugoslavia. On June
9 , during consideration on the House floor, Representative Skelton introduced an amendment
removing this provision.  Upon receiving written notice from President Clinton stating that
if military readiness were to be harmed by on-going operational requirements, he would
submit a further FY2000 budget request, the House agreed (270-155) to remove the funding
prohibition. The Administration has submitted an FY2000 supplemental appropriation request
for $2.02 billion, and a $1.7 billion request for FY2001.  Together with the $3 billion
appropriated for FY1999, this totals $6.9 billion for Kosovo operations.
The House version of the supplemental appropriation legislation (H.R. 3908) contains
$7.7 billion in add-ons to the Administration’s request.  The Senate leadership expressed
reservations about the additional funds, and now the Senate Appropriations Committee plans
to divide H.R. 3908 into three major components and consider them as part of the regular
FY2001 appropriation measures for Military Construction (DOD peacekeeping operations
in Kosovo and other DOD items), Foreign Operations (Plan Colombia, Kosovo aid, debt
relief, and Mozambique relief), and Agriculture (domestic natural disaster assistance).
Markups are scheduled for the week of May 8.  
On May 9, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved an amendment offered by
Sen. Byrd to the FY2001 DOD Military Construction bill which will cut all funds for Kosovo
operations on July 1, 2001 unless the President requests and receives congressional
permission for their continued deployment.
(For more information, see CRS Report RL30505: Appropriations for FY2001: Defense and
CRS Report RL30457: Supplemental Appropriations for FY2000: Plan Colombia, Kosovo,
Foreign Debt Relief, Home Energy Assistance, and Other Initiatives) 
Congressional Action
On March 11, 1999, the House approved H.Con.Res. 42 (219-191), which authorizes
the deployment of U.S. troops to Kosovo as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping operation,
subject to extensive reporting requirements, including reports to Congress in both classified
and unclassified forms regarding the following subjects: 
! Certification that U.S. forces will be under the operational control of U.S.
officers;
! Military resources committed;
! Percentage of U.S. troops participating compared to allied contributions;
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! Impact of deployment on U.S. military readiness;
! Intelligence-sharing arrangements;
! Rules of engagement;
! Russian participation;
! Roles and mission of U.S. forces in peace enforcement;
! Cost; and
! Exit strategy.
H.Con.Res. 42 has not been acted upon by the Senate.  However, on March 23, 1999
the Senate did pass S.Con.Res. 21 (58-41), authorizing the President to conduct military air
operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This measure failed
of passage in House (213-213) on April 28.
Also on April 28, 1999, the House defeated two measures sponsored by Representative
Campbell, H.Con.Res. 82 (139-290) and H.J.Res. 44 (2-427).  The former would have
required the withdrawal of U.S. forces from participation in offensive operations against the
Republic of Yugoslavia, and the latter would have declared a state of war between the United
States and  the Republic of Yugoslavia.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 106-31, H.R. 1141
A bill making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1999, and for other purposes. Reported by Committee on Appropriations
March 17; passed House (220-211) March 24.  Passed Senate  March 25.  Conference report
(H.Rept. 106-143) passed House and Senate May 20.  Signed into law May 21, 1999 (P.L.
106-31).
P.L. 106-65, S. 1059
An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for military activities of
the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.  Committee on Armed Services ordered to be reported an
original measure in lieu of S. 974 (S.Rept. 106-50) May 13.  Passed Senate (92-3) May  27.
Message on Senate actions received in House June 7.  House struck all after enacting clause
and inserted in lieu thereof the provisions of a similar measure, H.R. 1401, which passed
without objection.  Conference (H.Rept. 106-301) filed August 6, and agreed to by House
September 15, and by Senate September 22.  Signed into law (P.L. 106-65) October 5, 1999.
P.L. 106-79, H.R. 2651/S. 1122
A bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2000, and for other purposes. On July 20, Committee on Appropriations
reported an original measure (H.Rept. 106-244).  On July 21, passed House (379-45).  On
July 28, Senate struck all after enacting clause and substituted language of S. 1122 amended,
which passed by unanimous consent.  On October 8, conference report (H.Rept 106-371)
filed.  On October 13, House agreed to conference report (372-55), and Senate concurred
October 14  Signed into law October 25, 1999.
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P.L. 106-65, H.R. 1401 (Spence)
A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 for military activities
of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal years 2000
to 2001, and for other purposes. Introduced April 14, 1999; referred to Committee on Armed
Services.  Reported House by committee May 24, 1999 (H.Rept. 106-162).  Passed House
(365-58), June 10, 1999.  On June 14, the House struck all after the enacting clause of S.
1059, and inserted the provision of H.R. 1401. A conference agreement was reported on S.
1059 on August 5. The House approved the report by a vote of 375-45 on September 15, and
the Senate concurred by a vote of 93-5 on September 22. The President signed the bill into
law (P.L. 106-65) on October 5, 1999.
P.L.  106-246, H.R. 4425 
An original bill making appropriations for military construction, family housing, and base
realignment and closure for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September
30, 2001, and for other purposes including.  Reported May 11,2000 (H.Rept. 106-614).
Passed the House on May 16, 2000 (386-22, Roll No. 184).  On May 18, the Senate
substituted the language of S. 2521 including the FY2000 supplemental appropriations for
Kosovo operations, and passed the bill as amended (96-4, Record Vote No. 106).
Conference report (H.Rept. 106-710) filed on June 29, 2000.  Conference report approved
by the House on June 29 (306-110, Roll. No. 362), and by the Senate on June 30 by voice
vote.  Signed into law July 13, 2000 (P.L. 106-246)
H.R. 647 (Paul)
A bill to prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense from being
used for the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in Kosovo unless that deployment is
specifically authorized by law.  Introduced February 9, 1999; referred to Committee on
Armed Services.
H.R. 1569 (Fowler)
A bill to prohibit the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense from being
used for the deployment of ground elements of the United States Armed Forces in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia unless that deployment is specifically authorized by law.  Introduced
April 27, 1999; reported to House by Committee on Rules, and passed House (249-180) April
28, 1999.  Received in Senate April 29, 1999.
H.R. 1664 (Young)
A bill making emergency supplemental appropriations for military operations, refugee
relief, and humanitarian assistance relating to the conflict in Kosovo, and for military
operations in Southwest Asia for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999,  and for other
purposes. Reported to House by Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 106-125) May 4;
passed House May 6 (311-105). In Senate unanimous consent agreement was reached to vote
on final passage June 18.[Kosovo-related supplemental funding was removed from this
legislation and included in H.R. 1141]
H.R. 3908 (Young)
A bill making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2000, and for other purposes. On March 14,  the House Committee on
Appropriations reported an original measure, H.Rept. 106-521, by Mr. Young (FL).  On
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March 30, the bill passed the 263 - 146 (Roll no. 95), and was received in the Senate and
referred to the Committee on Appropriations.
H.R. 4205 (Spence)
An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for military activities of
the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.  Introduced April 4, 2000; referred to Committee on Armed
Services.  Reported from Committee on May 12 (H.Rept. 106-616).  Passed the House, as
amended, May 18 (353-63; Roll No. 208).  Received in the Senate May 22, 2000. On July
13, the Senate struck all after the enacting clause and substituted the language of S. 2549 as
amended, and passed H.R. 4205 as amended,  97-3 (Roll Call vote 179).  Conference
requested on July 17, 2000.
H.R. 4576 (Lewis)
An original bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes.  Reported to House on June 6, 2000
(H.Rept. 106-644). Passed the House on June 7, 367-58 (Roll Call Vote No. 241). Passed
the Senate on June 13, as amended, 95-3 (Record Vote No. 127).  House-Senate Conference
report was filed on July 17 (H.Rept. 106-754), and was agreed to by the House on July 19,
367-58 (Roll Call Vote No. 413).
H.Res. 268 (Bereuter) 
A bill calling for equitable sharing of the costs associated with the reconstruction,
peacekeeping, and United Nations programs in Kosovo. Introduced July 30, 1999; referred
to Committee on International Relations.
H.Con.Res. 29 (Fowler) 
A concurrent resolution expressing the opposition of Congress to any deployment of
U.S. ground forces in Kosovo, a province in the Republic of Serbia, for peacemaking or
peacekeeping purposes. Introduced February 10, 1999; referred to Committee on
International Relations.
H.Con.Res. 42 (Gilman)
A concurrent resolution regarding the use of U.S. Armed Forces as part of a NATO
peacekeeping operation implementing a Kosovo peace agreement. Introduced March 8, 1999;
referred to Committee on International Relations.  Rules Committee resolution, H.Res. 103,
reported to House March 10.  Passed House March 11, 1999 (219-191).  Received in Senate
March 16, 1999.
H.Con.Res. 82 (Campbell) 
A concurrent resolution directing the President, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War
Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from their positions in connection
with the present operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Introduced April 12,
1999; referred to Committee on International Relations. Reported April 27 (H.Rept. 106-
116).  Failed of passage in House April 28 (139-290).
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H.J.Res. 44 (Campbell)  
A joint resolution declaring a state of war between the United States and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Introduced April 12, 1999; referred to
Committee on International Relations.  Reported April 27 (H.Rept. 106-115).  Failed of
passage in House April 28 (2-427).
S. 2549 (Warner)
An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for military activities of
the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the
Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.  Committee on Armed Services reported an original measure
(S.Rept. 106-292) May 22, 2000. Considered by the Senate June 7-July 13; incorporated as
amended, into H.R. 4205 on July 13.
S. 2593 (Stevens)
An original bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2001, and for other purposes.  The Committee on Appropriations
reported an original measure May 18, 2000 (S.Rept. 106-298). On June 8, the Senate
incorporated this measure in H.R. 4576 as an amendment.
S.Con.Res. 21 (Biden)
Authorizing the President of the United States to conduct military air operations and
missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Introduced March 23, 1999;
passed, without amendment, March 23, 1999 (58-41).  Message on Senate action sent to
House March 24.  Failed of passage in House April 28 (213-213).
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Issue Brief IB98041, Kosovo and U.S. Policy,  by Julie Kim and Steven Woehrel
(updated regularly).
World Wide Web Sites
The following WWW sites provide additional information:
KFOR Headquarters — [http://kforonline.com]
NATO Headquarters — [http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press.htm]
U.S. European Command — [http://www.eucom.mil]
U.S. Air Force —[http://www.af.mil/current/kosovo/]
